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The Icon of the Zombie Mob
Abstract
The research question of the article is: In the film World War Z (Marc 
Forster, 2013) not only the iconology of the zombie has changed, 
also its iconography is new. How does this double alteration of the 
zombie influence its iconic significance? A hypothetical answer to 
this question is based on an investigation of the locations of the 
film, including the climactic battle scene with zombies in Moscow 
Red Square, which was dropped from the final cut. This answer is 
contextualized in a description of the relatively short cultural his-
tory of the zombie with its most recent manifestation in this film. 
The article sees this zombie manifestation as a mob, a new kind of 
magnification monster that has entered the global body politic. This 
is in a more specific sense than the prevalent understanding of the 
zombie as an icon of fear of globalisation; but it is also a continua-
tion of the cultural critique of mass society as expressed in for in-
stance George Romero’s zombie film trilogy. If the zombie has be-
come the mob, then a reciprocal question remains. Why has the 
mob been depicted as zombies in World War Z? Here a historical 
contextualisation can provide an answer, and the article connects 
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including the so-called “Year of the crowd”, 1989 to contemporary 
media iconography of mobs in especially Middle Eastern politics. 
Finally, the article connects the double nature of a cultural icon as 
both popular and a hegemonic tool to the historically dualistic con-
ception of mobs.
Keywords #mob, #zombie, # ochlocracy, #World War Z, #crowd
In contrast to the aristocratic vampire, the zombie has always be-
longed to the underclass of monsters. With humble folkloristic Hai-
tian voodoo beginnings as a few mindless slaves in sugarcane plan-
tations the zombie of today has become empowered with potential 
of world domination, and it has become a negative icon of globali-
sation. In the blockbuster film, World War Z (Marc Forster 2013) 
humanity is on the brink of extinction and milliards of zombies 
nearly take over the world. It is characteristic of the zombies in this 
film that they manifest themselves as a destructive mob, and it is 
the aim of this article to examine how and why the icon of the zom-
bie has changed in this way, both iconographically and iconologi-
cally. It is the hypothesis of the article that the role of crowds in the 
present period leads to changes in the general iconography of zom-
bies, and that this change is reflected in World War Z. To explain the 
zombie’s current iconic status as threatening ochlocracy, i.e. mob 
rule, the article will briefly describe the mutable icon of the zombie. 
This approach is historical, as its subject is the change in the iconog-
raphy and the iconology of the zombie. These changes will be ex-
plained by primarily the historical development of the role and 
functions of the crowd, including the form of ochlocracy. Finally, 
the film World War Z will be analysed in this light, and the film will 
be characterized as a manifestation of the new zombie icon that be-
longs to the sphere of the global body politic.
The Zombie as Monster
An obvious, but still necessary point of departure is that zombies do 
not exist in reality. Yet in fiction, they abound. In his Theories of Inter­
national Politics and Zombies (2011), Daniel W. Drezner has demon-
strated a spectacular growth in interest in zombies since the 1960s 
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ported by Google’s Ngram viewer that records the occurrence of the 
word “zombie” in Google Books from 1800 to 2008 like this:
Drezner’s survey shows that it is not only fiction e.g., zombie mov-
ies, video games and television series, which zombies infest, but 
generally in the media and in scholarly publications. The post-2000 
zombie spread in both fiction and other media may indicate that 
the zombie has become an icon of certain aspects of contemporary 
life, primarily fear of globalization, but also because of the mind-
less mob behaviour of modern-day zombies of a globalized world 
as the ultimate mass society. The bearer of this iconicity is the run-
ner zombie. Metonymically, it has been magnified into numberless 
crowds that spread exponentially, infesting the whole world unaf-
fected by ineffective and muddled countermeasures carried out far 
too late by national authorities. The traditional slow and lumber-
ing zombie is the type fusion monster, which in Noel Carroll’s The 
Philosophy of Horror (Carroll 1990, 42-52) is defined by its being two 
categories at the same time, in this case dead, yet living. The mod-
ern runner zombie that appears in hordes, swarms or mobs, i.e. in 
great numbers, is also Carroll’s magnification monster type. This 
monster type is a creature that is already dangerous or repellent, 
but by becoming extremely large in size or in numbers, it becomes 
monstrous. The combination of its magnification characteristics 
with the mindless horde behaviour of this zombie type allows it to 
become a general icon of the mob. 
The abject nature of the living corpse, the zombie can cause nau-
sea and fear in its reception in fiction; yet as it does not exist out-
side fiction, the reception of it is also characterized by what may be 
called the interpretative imperative. As this monster is a sign, like 
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it must necessarily have other significations. It is here that the zom-
bie can be regarded as an icon that it culturally determined, and as 
such changeable. This interpretative imperative demands that the 
audience of a zombie movie like World War Z seeks to understand 
the monster and its specific narrative as nothing but a sign, but also 
a sign embedded in a specific historical context. This context pro-
vides the clues to its significance. Monsters are then signs of what 
worries and causes fear in a historical and social context (Chris-
tensen 2012a, 39) and regarded as this, they are useful objects of 
analysis and interpretation.
The Film: World War Z
The plot structure of World War Z departs from both the formulaic 
narrative pattern of the generic monster film and from the zombie 
film of the apocalyptic type. The formula of the generic monster 
film may look like this:
• One or more victims are attacked, but it is unclear by what or 
by whom?
• The protagonists of the film suspect that the attacker is a mon-
ster.
• The protagonists seek to prove the existence of the monster and 
to convince the authorities (police, army) about its existence.
• The monster visualization: the monster is seen by the protago-
nists and by the film’s audience.
• The monster is defeated.
• Epilogue: The monster may show signs of life and a threat of 
resurrection. (Christensen 2012b, 43-44)
As it may be seen, the conflict in this formula is just as much of a 
phenomenological nature as it is physical. The similar pattern and 
content of the subgenre the zombie film of the apocalyptic type are 
described by Kyle William Bishop in his American Zombie Gothic 
(2010): “the apocalyptic invasion of our world by hordes of cannibal-
istic, contagious, and animated corpses… These generic protocols 
include not only the zombies themselves and the imminent threat of 
violent death, but also a post-apocalyptic backdrop: the collapse of 
societal infrastructures, the resurgence of survivalist fantasies, and 
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ments and subgenre characteristics may be gleaned from Bishop: 
Zombie movies are almost always set during (or shortly after) the 
apocalypse, where the infrastructures of police or military cease to 
exist, and there are scanty media reports that zombies have overrun 
the country before the media gradually become silent (22). Survivors 
hole up in shopping malls or underground bunkers and are under 
siege, but relief never arrives (22). Looting becomes practically legal 
(23). The zombies have a virus-like reproductive process, they can-
not be reasoned with (20), and they are in an active state of decay 
(21), yet “the zombies pursue living humans with relentless, tireless 
dedication and kill people mercilessly by eating them alive” (20). 
“Once people start to die at an uncontrollable rate, panic rages 
through all levels of the government and the military… and most 
are more interested in saving themselves and their families than 
simply doing their jobs.” (23)
 Compare to this the action of World War Z. Retired UN problem 
solver Gerry Lane (Brad Pitt) and his family barely escape zombie 
attacks in Philadelphia. The zombie infestation spreads like wildfire. 
Lane is in contact with the UN Deputy Secretary-General Thierry 
Umutoni, who wants him to combat the zombie plague, and Lane 
and his family are flown to sanctuary on a U.S. aircraft carrier in the 
Atlantic Ocean. To try to develop a vaccine against the zombie virus 
Lane is flown with a virologist to an American military base in South 
Korea. The virologist is killed, but there Lane is told by a CIA agent 
that he must go to Jerusalem to seek information from an Israel gov-
ernment official. Lane flies to Israel, which was the first country to 
believe in the zombie outbreak, and therefore had managed to build 
high walls to protect its citizens from the zombies. However, Jerusa-
lem is overrun by zombies. Lane notices that the zombie horde ig-
nores a sick old man and a dying boy. Lane and an Israel soldier es-
cape from the city to go to Wales to a WHO virology laboratory. 
There Lane and some scientists discover that if a human is infected 
with a fatal disease, he is invisible to the zombies. The zombie is host 
for the virus, and the virus only wants healthy new carriers. Lane is 
united with his family, and based on the information he has pro-
vided the UN can develop a vaccine so that people become immune 
to the zombie pandemic. A 12-minutes climatic Russian scene was 
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In World War Z itself, there is no initial phenomenological doubt 
about the existence of the zombie infestation. This doubt, it is ex-
plained, lies before the beginning of the film, and in a scene with the 
Israeli government official this phenomenological doubt is directly 
addressed. Due to the tragic history of the Jews, the most unlikely 
and monstrous occurrences in the world cannot be ruled out, and 
therefore the state of Israel was quick to respond to the threat. It fol-
lows that the monster visualisation is quite early in the film. It ap-
pears in a close-up only nine and a half minutes into the film, the 
total running time of which is 116 minutes. In the same way the 
protagonist of the film, Gerry Lane has no such phenomenological 
doubt, and as he is a member himself of the authorities, he does not 
have to follow the generic narrative pattern of having to convince 
these authorities of anything. Though the authorities are exiled to 
ships in the Atlantic, they are the acting protagonist of the film, per-
sonalised in Lane. This is a significant shift from the formula, and 
this change must be seen in conjunction with the hypothesis of the 
article that the role of crowds in the present period leads to changes 
in the general iconography of zombies. Local and in many cases 
national governmental power structures have been destroyed. For 
instance, the American president and four of six Joint Chiefs V.P 
have become victims to the zombie virus, but a new more global 
executive power has arisen in the film with the UN. Another sig-
nificant departure from the generic zombie genre is the sheer mov-
ability of the action of the film. Siege situations with survivors be-
ing surrounded by hordes of zombies are present in the film, but 
the main plot structure is the itinerary of Lane. This is not surpris-
ing as he is on a quest to find the elixir or vaccine to save the world. 
As he advises another character, “I used to work in dangerous plac-
es. People who moved survive, and those who didn’t... Movement 
is life.”, and so the locations of the film become Philadelphia, New-
ark, a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Atlantic Ocean, a U.S. army camp in 
South Korea, Jerusalem, a WHO research facility in Wales, and 
Nova Scotia. Family values loom large in the film, yet it is only 
when the protagonist decides to leave his family that the world is 
saved. The part of the zombie film template that states that “Once 
people start to die at an uncontrollable rate, panic rages through all 
levels of the government and the military… and most are more in-






The Icon of the Zombie Mob
Jørgen Riber Christensen
their jobs.” (Bishop 2010, 23) is contradicted by this film, which 
transposes its subject from the private sphere to a public sphere. 
The conflict of the film is not of an epistemological nature, but it is 
a physical struggle between world governmental forces and hordes 
of zombies, and it is not between a group of protagonists and au-
thorities that will not be convinced about the monstrous threat. The 
conflict is between governmental authorities, which are always pre-
sented in a favourable light, and unruly and irrational mobs of 
zombies, which cannot be controlled or contained. The political as-
pects of this film are stressed by international UN leadership, but 
also by the role of national states. For instance, it is reported that 
grotesquely North Korea solved the risk of infection from conta-
gious zombie bites by pulling out all the teeth of its entire popula-
tion. The Israeli solution of enclosure by high walls to keep out the 
zombie realistically mirrors its present-day 440 km long security 
wall or fence. It may now be tentatively stated that the subject of the 
film belongs to the body politic, and the next part of the article in-
vestigates the concepts of crowds and mobs.
Mobs and Crowds in History
In Charles Dickens’ Barnaby Rudge: A Tale of the Riots of Eighty (1840-
41) mob behaviour is described as irrational and without any con-
trol, and also insensible in the meaning that the members of the 
mob or rioters were unaware of bodily pain and injuries (Dickens 
1840-41/1868, 135). This kind of behaviour is also what character-
izes the zombies in many scenes of World War Z. They can only be 
exterminated by direct shots into the brain. All other injuries are 
ignored by the zombies. In the book, which was adapted into the 
film, Max Brooks’ World War Z An Oral History of the Zombie War 
the description of the Battle of Yonkers contains this description of 
zombie behaviour, similar to Dickens’ mob:
And then they came, right out of the smoke like a freakin’ 
little kid’s nightmare! Some were steaming, some were 
even still burning . . . some were walking, some crawling, 
some just dragging themselves along on their torn bellies 
. . . maybe one in twenty were still able to move, which left 
. . . shit . . . a couple thousand? And behind them, mixing 
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maining million that the air strike hadn’t even touched! 
(Brooks 2006/2007, 102)
The article now sets out to examine whether the physical likeness 
between the zombie mobs of World War Z and these literary mobs 
is supplemented by any ideological likeness also. In the following, 
there will be a movement from ochlocracy to historical conceptions 
of the crowd as a framework for the zombie mobs in World War Z.
It was not until around 1950 that crowds were regarded as a pos-
sibly beneficial force in the body politic. In Antiquity, Polybius de-
scribed how mob rule, ochlocracy, was a perversion of popular gov-
ernment, i.e. democracy: “…democracy comes into existence; which 
again by its violence and contempt of law becomes sheer mob-rule.” 
(Polybius 2014, Book 6.4) Ochlocracy (from Greek okhlos “mob” 
and kratos “rule, power, strength”) was one of the three forms of bad 
government, the other two being tyranny and oligarchy. Polybius’ 
characterization of ochlocracy as contempt of law and violence does 
not necessarily apply to any crowd. In his “Crowds in History” 
Manfred Gailus defines crowds as “relatively short-term gatherings 
of large groups of people (on streets or squares or in the country-
side—in any event, in the open air), whose actions are goal oriented 
and, as a rule, conflictual.” (Gailus 2001, 3022). Negative and posi-
tive attitudes to crowds were personified primarily by Gustave Le 
Bon around 1900 on the one hand, and George Rudé and Eric Hobs-
bawm around 1950 on the other.
Gustave Le Bon’s school regarded crowds as destructive, irre-
sponsible, irrational, and highly suggestible as the individual in a 
crowd lost its usual inhibitions and morals and conscious personal-
ity. It came “in possession of a sort of collective mind” instead of its 
own individual faculties (Le Bon 2009/1896, 21), and crowds are re-
garded as “barbarians”, as “Crowds are only powerful for destruc-
tion” (12). Le Bon viewed crowds as inherently conservative, and so 
crowds were not regarded by him as political instruments of any 
societal progressive change. We shall soon see how the Rudé and 
Hobsbawm school had the opposite opinion that crowds could be 
historical, political forces of change. Le Bon’s description of the col-
lective mind of crows adds to this lack of any historical impetus: 
“they can never accomplish acts demanding a high degree of intel-
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mulated.” (23) It follows implicitly that crowds are led, but the lead-
er of a crowd “is nothing more than a ringleader or agitator” (108), 
and “The leaders of crowds wield a very despotic authority” (111). 
Here Le Bon echoes Polybius’ ochlocracy with a mob being manipu-
lated by demagogues as a bad system of government. As this article 
is dealing with a film about a pandemic zombie infestation, it may 
be helpful to consider what Le Bon writes about the mechanism of 
contagion as a special characteristic of crowds: “In a crowd, every 
sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such a degree 
that individuals readily sacrifice their personal interest to the collec-
tive interest.” (24)
 More specific historical studies than those of Le Bon have nu-
anced the view of crowds and their role in history. Gailus stresses 
that European crowds were not politically aimless. Food riots and 
riots for liberties have dominated (Gailus 2001, 3024-3025). Rudé 
and Hobsbawm argued that crowds did have specific goals. These 
might be a sort of collective bargaining through riots, often per-
formed in the hands of specific social classes such as peasants, 
working men and women; but they might also be conservative 
such as “Church and King Mobs”. Therefore, the revision of Le 
Bon’s Psychology of Crowds has as its main thrust that there were 
not only “bad crowds”, but also “good crowds”, which could be 
regarded as forerunners of later democratic mechanisms and social 
and political organisations (Gailus 2001, 3024). 
Recent years, which are also the historical context of World War Z, 
have manifested the paradoxical political role of crowds as both con-
servative and progressive. The changes in Eastern Europe in the late 
1980s have been regarded as a result of popular protests when the 
people of for instance Leipzig, East Germany took to the streets. 
1989 was described as “The year of the crowd” by a special issue of 
The New Statesman. The magazine lists crowds as agents of so-called 
Velvet Revolutions behind the Iron Curtain in Romania overthrow-
ing the dictator Ceausescu, in Prague and Bratislava, Czechoslova-
kia, riots in Kosovo, pro-democracy protesters in Sofia, Bulgaria, 
and mass demonstrations in the Baltic States. 1989 was also the year 
when the Iranian ayatollah Khomeini died, and the mourners at his 
burial counted millions so that the ceremony was disrupted. People 
were killed and 10,800 people were treated for injuries. Time de-
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comprehensible” (Buchan 2009, 28) with the body falling out of the 
coffin. The same year a much smaller crowd of 1,000 Muslim pro-
testers burned copies of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses in Brad-
ford in Britain (Malik 2009, 40-41). This crowd with the burning 
book has been described as “an icon of Islamic rage, and portent of 
a new kind of conflict” (40). On a much larger and much more vio-
lent scale this kind of conflict with uncontrollable rage in mobs was 
regrettably provoked by the so-called Muhammad cartoons contro-
versy in 2005. Crowds or mobs in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, 
Libya, Nigeria, Indonesia, the Palestinian territories and in other 
countries rioted with more than 150 deaths, and Danish and Norwe-
gian embassies were beleaguered by mobs and set on fire (Wikipe-
dia 2014). News coverage of these riots like “Muslim cartoon fury 
claims lives” (BBC 2006a) described mob scenes and also showed 
footage of rampaging mobs (BBC 2006b). Kenan Malik concept of an 
“icon of Islamic rage, and a portent of a new kind of conflict” (Malik 
2009, 40) based on the protest against The Satanic Verses in 1989 and 
hugely expanded almost globally in 2005 and 2006 must be included 
in a description of the history of mobs or crowds. However, the civil 
resistance and progressive aspects of the role of mobs or crowds in 
and after 2010 in the Arab Spring nuances this picture, and the Arab 
Spring has been compared to 1989 (Cook 2011). The article now 
moves on to consider how these new manifestations of mobs may 
have been reflected in fiction films such as World War Z and changed 
the icon of the zombie.
Conclusion: The Icon of the Zombie as a Mob
It is the hypothesis of the article that the role of crowds in this his-
torical period leads to changes in the general iconography of zom-
bies, and that this change is reflected in World War Z. We have seen 
that not only this iconography has been changed, but also that the 
formulaic structure of the zombie narrative is reformulated in the 
film. The iconological method has its roots in art history; in particu-
lar in Erwin Panofsky’s work (Panofsky 1939/1972). Explained in 
brief, this method deals with the identification of the subject and 
motifs of art, and its aim is to explain the specific form of a subject 
in the piece of art to be analysed. There are three steps in this me-
thod. In the pre-iconographic step the shapes and colours of a paint-
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The iconographic step combines these objects into narratives, e.g. 
The Genesis Flood narrative. The successful completion of this step 
is dependent on cultural competences. The final step explains why 
the specific rendition of the narrative has been given its specific 
form. This is done by combining the symbolical values of the piece 
of art to its historical, functional context, or as Panofsky puts it to 
”the political, poetical, religious, philosophical, and social tenden-
cies of the personality, period or country under investigation” (Pan-
ofsky 1939/1972, 16).
In the case of zombies the pre-iconographic and the iconographic 
step pose a phenomenological challenge that is met by intertextual 
competences as zombies do not exist outside fiction, though the 
zombie can be recognized as an abject corpse combined with a living 
person as the zombie is a fusion monster (Carroll 1990, 43). As the 
cultural history of zombies does not go further back than the 1930s, 
the iconological step is not unsurmountable, and only a condensed 
history of the zombie icon in ”the political, poetical, religious, philo-
sophical, and social tendencies of the personality, period or country 
under investigation” will be offered here as it is available elsewhere 
(Bishops 2010, Christensen 2012a, Christiansen 2012). In the 1930s 
and 1940s, the zombie was a scarce, dumb and slow-moving folklor-
istic victim and an icon of colonial suppression as seen in Victor Hal-
perin’s White Zombie (1932) and Jacques Tourneur’s I Walked with a 
Zombie (1943). However, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s there was an 
iconological change, as zombies appeared in fairly large numbers 
and they were cannibalistic. The zombie now became part of a cul-
tural critique of primarily American mass society. In George Rome-
ro’s films it had become an icon of the family institution, mindless 
consumerism, and the scientific and military complex in Night of the 
Living Dead (1968), Dawn of the Dead (1978) and Day of the Dead (1985).
During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a significant shift in zom-
bie iconology, as the zombie became a magnification monster of 
pandemic proportions. Zombies became many, often described as 
swarms or hordes, and they became fast, the so-called runner type. 
One of the first instances was Dan O’Bannon’s The Return of the Liv­
ing Dead (1985) with around 100 zombies of the runner type, and in 
Ruben Fleischer’s Zombieland (2009) zombies were pandemic, and 
they could be iconologically understood as an icon of globalization 
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most zombie films until now that the action was that a group of 
survivors holed up under siege and if there was movement, it was 
only from one safe place to another. However, the iconological 
change of the meaning of the zombie from its first manifestations 
has been so fundamental that its iconography has been altered. Pre-
sent-day zombie are fast, furious and magnifications monsters to 
the extent that they through their numbers are pandemic. The nar-
rative structure with its locations of World War Z and the quest of an 
American with his Israeli allied against mobs of zombies that are 
presented iconographically not unlike news media footage of Mid-
dle Eastern mobs, but also mobs of zombies in American cities, has 
added a new iconological signification to the fictional zombie mon-
ster. It has now become a contemporary icon of mobs, and this icon 
can be identified more specifically as the mob, characterized by Le 
Bon’s original, conservative view. The zombie icon of the mob is Le 
Bon’s mob reborn, and this mob is solely destructive and not a po-
litical instrument of change for something better. As Le Bon claimed, 
this mob is manipulated by demagogues, which in this film has 
made the zombie mobs into unconscious and unwitting instru-
ments of a lethal and global virus. The film’s choice of locations is 
some of the world’s hot spots: The Middle East and Korea, and the 
deleted Moscow scenes. The view of global politics in the film World 
War Z with this choice of locations is bordering on being defeatist as 
political antagonists are represented as magnification monsters be-
yond understanding and control. In the film, the zombie as a mag-
nification monster has become a dark cultural icon of a world that 
is populated by mobs and is globally ungovernable.
A couple of times in the article we have seen that the terms crowds 
and mobs have been used interchangeably, and we have seen that 
they have been used negatively and positively about their role in 
the body politic through history. This dualism also applies to the 
film World War Z and its construction of zombies as a cultural icon. 
Especially the film’s Jerusalem scenes with the wall unsuccessfully 
keeping out the besieging zombies has so obvious relevance to con-
temporary Middle-Eastern politics that it more than any other as-
pects of the film foregrounds the interpretative imperative, and the 
audience can find it hard not to draw parallels to the conflict be-
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In conclusion, this double significance of the icon of the zombies 
in the film is in accord with how a cultural icon is defined in Walter 
W. Hölbling’s US Icons and Iconicity (2006). Hölbling notes that a 
condition necessary for an icon to obtain a lasting value is its am-
bivalence. It must function “as hegemonic tools of dominant groups 
to control the shifting identities of the mass of people, and on the 
other hand, as democratic elements in the media age, as symbols of 
popular identities and interests. Icons can thus be expressions both 
of dominant and popular interest” (Hölbling 2006, 8). That the zom-
bie has taken on the form of mobs in the global body politic in World 
War Z demonstrates this ambivalent and tension-filled cultural and 
social function of icons.
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